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An EU without the UK would be one step closer to a genuine
political union.
by Blog Admin
Bart Cammaerts writes that if the EU is to survive in the years to come it must start making
a genuine difference for its citizens and become not only a champion for free markets and
peace, but also for solidarity, social justice and welfare. He argues that this may not be
achievable with the UK continuing as a currently unwilling member of the club.
With much pomp and circumstance the European Union received the Nobel peace prize
last week in Oslo; UK Prime Minister David Cameron was one of  the f ew European
polit ical leaders not present at the highly symbolic ceremony. For the European project to
succeed in these turbulent and very conf lictual t imes, social solidarity across Europe and social
responsibility f rom companies and employers has to be democratically enf orced and guaranteed. This is
only possible without the UK as an EU member.
Norway is paradoxically a country that has f or a variety of  – mainly nationalistic and economic – reasons
always remained outside of  the EU. Polls indicate that today more than 70 per cent of  the Norwegian
population is against Norway joining the EU. At the same time, inside the EU or should I say the
eurozone, the European institutions and even Europe as a polit ical project have never been challenged
so f undamentally as in recent years, f rom the right and the lef t alike. The right sees European
institutions as big government, subsidised and subsidising too much, inf ringing national sovereignty by
imposing over-protective social policies, too open immigration rules and many other progressive policies
that challenge ‘our ’ way of  doing things. The lef t crit iques Europe because the EU lacks a social
conscience or soul. They argue that it is too much of  a neo- liberal project geared towards protecting
f ree trade and f ree markets, as witnessed in its emphasis on liberalisation and privatisation over many
decades, or in its handling of  the eurozone crisis which is currently imposing social havoc on Southern
Europe.
The EU as an idea, as well as institutionally, has
always embodied a duality f rom its very
inception. Back then it was about the f ixing of
f undamental polit ical (post-WW2) conf licts
through neutralising economic conf licts (steel
and coal production and consumption). Over the
years, the European Commission and the many
policies emanating f rom it have had to navigate
and balance out two very distinct and in many
ways competing visions of  Europe. First, we
have those that see Europe primarily as a f ree
trade area, devoid of  a social chapter, solidarity
principles and merely instrumental in supporting
the market economy, protecting capitalist
interests and driving consumption. Second, there
are those that cherish a vision of  a strong
Europe that sets social standards, protects its
cit izens/workers, places limits onto the market,
regulates and protects solidarity mechanisms,
and intervenes when markets f ail. EU policy is
and always has been a compromise between
these two radically dif f erent paradigms of  what
the EU is about.
In media and communication policy this played out as f ollows: f or many years the European
Commission’s mantra in this area has been that liberalisation and privatisation is essentially a good thing
f or costumers. But operators still need to insure a universal service, which ref ers back to communication
as a public good. This means that in many EU member states postal services are still state-owned
because the market will not serve rural and remote areas. EU regulation in terms of  broadcasting exhibits
a similar schizophrenic att itude. Besides enabling a commercial television landscape to emerge, and
breaking broadcasting monopolies, the EU has also explicit ly protected public service broadcasting,
which in turn elicits accusations by commercial broadcasters of  unf air competit ion. In other areas we can
see similar seemingly contradictory policies that are the result of  the clash between these two competing
conceptions of  what the EU is there f or.
There are of  course also those that completely reject Europe as an idea and as a legit imate power in
shaping national polit ics. Also at this level we see a mix of  reactionary rightwing reasons (e.g. the
arguments against Europe f ormulated by UKIP and Conservative Eurosceptics in the UK, Geert Wilders in
the Netherlands, or the True Finns in Finland) and lef twing populist aspirations of  sovereign
independence (e.g. anti-European discourses prevalent in the polit ical discourses of  Syriza in Greece or
the Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands).
A broader and more important crit ique directed at the EU as an idea and as a polit ical project is that of  its
weak democratic legit imacy. The EU will always be a complex power matrix incorporating a wide variety of
interests and approaches. These include small and large countries, market oriented and social/socialist
oriented ideologies, pro-European and anti-European perspectives, and arguments in f avour of
more/less European integration. The question is how European decision making can be seen as being in
the interest of  all its cit izens, democratically legit imated by its cit izens.
This is certainly problematic as the EU’s demos is highly f ragmented and at t imes deeply conf lictual when
it comes to European versus national/regional/local identit ies. While one growing part rejects the
European project, those in f avour of  it tend to use ‘Europe’ instrumentally to either f oster market- led
solutions to problems, f ormulate state-regulatory answers, or to blame it f or unpopular, but supposedly
necessary measures. This impedes a coherent and long-term vision of  what Europe is about and how it
can and should serve us collectively as European cit izens. Some espouse the need f or a genuine polit ical
and social union that matches the economic and monetary union, with proper democratic legit imacy to
keep markets in check, rather than protecting their interests, and also to ensure mutual solidarity within
the union and beyond. I think such a vision f or Europe is what it ought be, not what it is today (to
paraphrase Gramsci).
Many progressive voices are crit ical of  Europe in its current f orm, but still adhere to its ideals, and think
that in order to reach what it ‘ought to be’ the UK has to ef f ectively leave the union. Indeed, many pro-
European observers across Europe would actually be quite happy if  the UK were to leave voluntarily.
Why? It would open the appealing prospect of  not having to negotiate collective solutions with the
obstructive ‘navel staring’ Brits at the table. From this perspective many pro-European elites across the
EU are quite happy that the public debate in the UK is ever- f aster moving towards a ‘Brixit ’. Bring on the
‘in or out’ ref erendum as f ast as possible, they ask, now that public opinion has been willf ully massaged
into believing it is in their interest to leave the EU altogether.
While I do not think that this is a particularly healthy attitude and the Brit ish population should know
better, an EU without the UK as a member would obviously make more radical, and some would argue
more ef f ective/necessary, solutions to the current eurozone crisis a more genuine polit ical possibility.
Proposed solutions such as the Europeanisation of  national public debts, a minimum standard of
employee rights and employer obligations across the EU, the implementation of  more stringent taxation
laws f or multi-national companies active in the EU, a ‘Tobin tax’ on f inancial transactions in the EU, a
stricter and more robust regulatory oversight on the f inancial institutions (and exuberant bonuses) have
clearly not made it onto the negotiating table, despite more than f our years of  f inancial mayhem. The
loss in standard of  lif e experienced by European cit izens is the inevitable price we seem to have to pay
f or the systemic f ailure of  capitalism.
Germany and the UK, supported by some Nordic and some rightwing led countries, have been very
ef f ective in blocking many of  the ideas f ormulated above. In many European countries where pronounced
right-wing coalit ions are in power, the UK is of ten a usef ul and instrumental actor to stop more lef t-wing
and EU-wide solutions to come onto the EU policy agenda f or concerted action. Hence Merkel
supporting Cameron in rejecting the EU budget at the European Council summit in November. It goes
without saying that not having the UK in the equation in this regard would f undamentally shif t the power-
balance in terms of  achieving the necessary (qualif ied) votes needed to stop certain proposals and
decisions f rom becoming EU law in a vast amounts of  areas of  economic and social lif e where qualif ied
majorit ies are suf f icient to push through decisions.
However, this is not merely about a social and cit izen oriented agenda, it goes way beyond this and
reaches an epistemological level beyond lef t or right. This is because there is also a very powerf ul
European elite at play here, one that still passionately believes in the European dream: ‘Ich bin ein
Europäer’.  It relates to the visionary polit ical project with a historical legacy of  over 60 years (not all of
which the UK shares), of  polit ical leaders as well as large parts of  the population subscribing to the
dream and long-term vision of  a democratic, polit ically/economically united and thus peacef ul Europe –
precisely what the Nobel committee celebrated. From this pro-European perspective the UK leaving the
EU is also a good prospect, as it would empower those that want to use this current crisis as an
opportunity, as a crow bar in a sense, to make the long-standing dream of  a genuine polit ical European
Union a reality.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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